

Introducing an Epistemological Paradigm and Its Ontological Origin through the Metaphysical Deconstruction of Language as the Model of Expression

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Abstract:

The model of language can relatively concretely reveal the mechanism of the epistemology, which is extended by the ontology that takes “person” as the unit. It unveils an intuited dimension to represent the epistemology’s paradigm and limitations. Deriving from the inherent relation between epistemology and ontology, the retrospection of the epistemology’s ontological origin can be actualized by locating or grasping the epistemological first person’s ontological essence. Hence, the illusional and frail essence of the ontology behind this epistemology would be uncovered. “Person” is not a stable unit in the ontological world, since the application of this unit stimulates the development of the operating style of the epistemology which relies on the supplement of paradox. After this study that intends to get the epistemological and ontological truth of the current using nominative, the new era of one or more unknown but solid epistemology and its ontology will be gradually recognized. Furthermore, the circumstance of past and current philosophical study is going to be changed.

Keywords: Ontology, Epistemology, Language, Modeling.

1. Introduction

In the contemporary time, as the fading of the epistemological research, which is not interacted to natural science, the initial problems of philosophy had been rarely prompted by anyway except involving natural science centered ontology. Nevertheless, this paper will base on the current epistemological content by uncovering the start point of epistemology- the first person (as the connection between epistemology and ontology), to represent its paradigm by linguistic model and delineate the range (i.e., clarify its limitation) in order to trace the ontological origin, which will make a periodical work to take a break from this classic topic to start the totally new story of discovery on new epistemology/ ontology. First and foremost, this paper will settle the background of this research, which is to stress the framework of the “symbolic” relationship between epistemology and ontology in the human world. Hence, the principle of epistemology to ontology’s research sequence will be explained. On top of that, this paper will deconstruct language from the angle of metaphysics to build the preparation of the linguistic model’s application. Also, the preparation work includes the description of the conjecture about the uniqueness of human’s epistemology to keep the contextual rigor. Thus, the generalized epis-

temology’s paradigm of interaction between the oriented concept and unoriented concept can be performed by the model of language for the tangible representation. Accordingly, the disability of this epistemology on grasping and the incompatible truth of its first person (the epistemology’s ontological representation) with the concept of “person” will be uncovered. Hereupon, there will be an explanation about the content in this research that looks like paradox to ensure the integrality of this research toward readers. Finally, this paper will serve as a foundation to outlook the research that may occur in the future about the unknown epistemology and ontology.

2. Epistemology and Ontology—the Initial Framework




Figure 1. The structure of epistemological research

For the philosophers who are attributed as “person(s)”, epistemology and ontology are a pair of twins (though they are not) that’s hard to give them an order of sequence: “I” use the epistemology to cognize the (ontological) objects, nevertheless, the first person of “I” needs to go through the epistemology to be cognized. Hence, it is necessary to clarify the relation between epistemology and ontology to comb the venation of the epistemological/ontological research.

However, the answer of ontology is always elusive. Hence, this paper will set it in the latter part as the endpoint of the clarification of the research about epistemological content (paradigm) by tracing from epistemology, which will parallelly process with the test of the ontological property of the cognized objects (whether the objects feedbacked by the epistemology is same as the guessed ontological objects, or other types of association between them). As a result, in order to avoid the problem of circular proof like Heidegger and Locke (two examples of philosophers in different styles with same problem- this problem exists in all philosophers who take the unknown information as the preconditional material of the research), all the objects (including the reflection of the first person) should be regarded as the epistemological result that removed all possible ontological essence purely at the period of the initial research of epistemology [1-2]:

... Thus to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity- the inquirer- transparent in his own being. The very asking of this question is an entity’s mode of Being; and as such it gets its essential character from what is inquired about- namely being. (The entity here is Dasein) ... In the question of the meaning of Being there is no “circular reasoning” but rather a remarkable “relatedness backward or forward” which what we are asking about (Being) bears to the inquiry itself as a mode of Being of an entity. Here what is asked about has an essential pertinence to the inquiry itself, and this belongs to the ownmost meaning [eigensten Sinn] of the question of Being. [1]

Heidegger’s circular proof was made by the presupposed pattern of entities, which is the target of his research, Being. This is similar to an equation like $x + y = x + 1$ with the answer $x = x + 1 - y$, the final purified truth of x can not be uncovered. The cognition about entities must go through the epistemology (entities appear epistemologically). Although setting the pattern of Being as a concept that does not rely on epistemology, it cannot match the nature of Being on entities: the idea of Being should be maximally provided with the ontological essence (it contains the scant of epistemology because it is related to the first person). However, entities are not allowed to offer the property of ontology; the reason is that they have been

considered as first person’s object to be brought into this discussion (for the first person, they utterly come from the epistemology). The only available Dasein for Heidegger as a reference is the first person (though the actual function of Dasein as a philosopher is still unclear, this is the only possible Dasein involves the relatedness as he mentioned), even if the application of first person might be confused with the reflection of the first person. Heidegger used the presupposed existed (having the nature of being) entities to prove and introduce the meaning of Being, which ignored the epistemological essence of those entities but completely leant to ontology (opposite to his teacher)- a person cannot see his eyes directly by his eyes; Heidegger was not the type of philosopher like Descartes: He could check the extension of entities by the example of the first person’s reflection and other objects because of that undoubtable God on his back (as he believed). Even if Heidegger set up the ontological system which can get rid of the epistemology. As a philosopher, his activity on philosophy research still exists as epistemological content. There is a necessary sequence to get him to build a bridge from the epistemological background (similar to how epistemology works on everyone who is not philosopher) that connects to his ontological answer. [1- 3].

If Heidegger was considered as the one who was lost in ontology, then Locke was the one who drew into the epistemology (not as serious as Berkely)- the creations of primary and secondary concepts are genius, but the problem was also obvious: he attributed the sensory system as the source of the primary concept [1, 2, 4]. This was the same problem as equaling the reflection of first person to first person- the sensory is a secondary concept that is used to cognize the origin of the primary concept, which is not the exact origin from the first person. This made his theory like two floors building that takes the second floor as its basement.

Because of this, the research of ontology after the research of epistemology would be clear—referring to the objects between the epistemology (see the graph), the first person and everything non-first person: epistemology itself is just used to anchor the first person – it (epistemology) is like the evidence a mysterious person left on the beach that helps us to pursue the origin and truth. Besides, the non-first person research is multiple (two points): first and foremost, is to navigate the relation among first person, non-first person, and the epistemological result (cognized objects). Yet the non-first person “entities” are just ontologically cryobiotic and gloomy. These “untouchables” can only relatively be revealed through the interaction with the first person. On the other hand, it is indispensable to check the source of the epistemological objects: before proving the unification between non-first person

and epistemological result (objects), they should be classified as different research objects (the epistemological objects do not involve the presupposed ontological property as the non-first person objects) – whether the two lines of the epistemological result and non-first person will intersect or not, the relations between limit of epistemology with the first person and other ontological objects will engage a primary answer – at least philosophers can make a stand based on this result. Within this, the obvious association from this part to the first person represents the validity of the offer to the first person of the prior position in this research. To clarify the value of the first person is the symbol of ontology's importance in the epistemological study, Husserl was overly ignored the ontology and his student Heidegger's overly correction dropped into the problem of the systematic invalidity [1, 5]. However, to totally get rid of the possible systematic problem (like the circular prove), there are points about the first person that need to be mentioned: the one is about the research towards the relation between the philosopher (researcher) with epistemology and ontology to check if the research's validity will be interfered by the location of the philosopher (the observation shouldn't ignore the viewer, which makes sure that the object of observation is the whole world – especially for philosophers who research the total universe); another is the seemingly transcendental pattern of the first person as “person”, which uncovers a secret of the epistemology – Why does this epistemology give me a world like this? (extended and unified by the unit of “person”) Whether the reason is from the property (nature) of the epistemology or the external ontology (non-first person)? The Section 6 will focus on it.

Here is a supplement introduction: above paragraph, the research sequence from epistemology to ontology was mentioned. However, there indeed had different situations: the less different one is the theology (the author considers it as a part of philosophy) and the philosophy (researches were directly called philosophy but extended from the concept of theology), which checks the epistemological content upon the solid base of the God (undoubtable and supreme ontology). Descartes was a symbolic example: God plays the foundation of his deduction. Nevertheless, people must contain the imperfect ability of cognition in their context, which makes the applicability of philosophers' theories hard to be decided (the research about epistemology and ontology should be dissected from the fixed knowledge to go beyond the level of cognized results and arrive the possible truth of principles) [3]. Moreover, someone had reversed the order—he turned the logic of theory from God- Person to Person- Person who replaces the God, which is Nietzsche [6]. This sequence also forced him to provide his opinion that supported Per-

son= First Person, as an agreement of the person pattern in epistemology and ontology. From Nietzsche, another situation can be reminded, that is the naïve dialectics. This situation broadly existed in ancient philosophy – it did not need the foundation of the supreme ontology (God) but directly faced the non-first person objects, because the naïve dialectics resisted and decreased the classification and polarization.

From Laozi [7]:

He broke the boundaries between two side of any contradictions then brought it back from the classified vision of the epistemology, which far not made the naïve dialects go to nihilism:

Great accomplishment seems imperfect,

Yet it does not outlive its usefulness.

Great fullness seems empty,

Yet cannot be exhausted.

Great straightness seems twisted.

Great intelligence seems stupid.

Great eloquence seems awkward.

Movement overcomes cold.

Stillness overcomes heat.

Stillness and tranquillity set things in order in the universe.

But his ontology is not epistemological:

The Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao.

The name that can be named is not the eternal name.

The nameless is the beginning of heaven and Earth.

The named is the mother of the ten thousand things.

Ever desireless, one can see the mystery.

Ever desiring, one sees the manifestations.

These two spring from the same source but differ in name; this appears as darkness.

Darkness within darkness.

The gate to all mystery.

Buddha's naïve dialect was more adequate than Laozi, he did not pursue the epistemological representation or application of the naïve dialectic truth [8]:

“All that has a form is illusive and unreal. When you see that all forms are illusive and unreal, then you will begin to perceive your true Buddha nature.” ... Because if they continue to hold onto arbitrary conceptions as to their own selfhood, they will be holding onto something that is non-existent. It is the same with all arbitrary conceptions of other selves, living beings, or a universal self. These are all expressions of non-existent things. Buddhas are Buddhas because they have been able to discard all arbitrary conceptions of form and phenomena, they have transcended all perceptions, and have penetrated the illusion of all forms.” Same as Laozi, the naïve dialectic world of Buddha connected the epistemological world by name.

And Heraclitus [9]:

He was closer to Laozi than Buddha, which kept epistemological classifications (to treat on the being as a person in the context made by the epistemology, Heraclitus and Daoist selected to beyond the epistemology from the standpoint in the epistemology, rather than the completely avoidance like the Buddha):

A road up <and > down <is > one and the same <road >.

Immortals < are > mortal (s), mortals immortal (s), these (the former?) living < in?> the death of those (the latter?), those (the latter?) dead in the life of these (the former?). Or: Mortals <are> immortal (s), immortals mortal (s), these (the latter?) living < in?> the death of those (the former?), those (the former?) dead in the life of these (the latter?).

While changing it rests.

The gradually united ontology was uncovered. The classification and polarization create the distance between the first person and objects, which can be vanished by naïve dialectics. Yet it also depends on the first person's (who uses the naïve dialectics) attitude, just like the explanation of Vajrayana from Dzongsar Jamyang Khyentse Rinpoche: To the anger, the Vajrayana just watch but do nothing to it (anger is not anger, it is a reflection, like the illusionary bubble). If the first person completely lets the cognition and action unified by the naïve dialectics, the value and units' number would be totally effaced: I am you, you are I, good is bad, bad is good... which causes the nihilistic nothingness". This possibility makes the essence substitute the existence. When Satre claimed "Existence precedes essence.", the two points can both probably stay, however, if it goes to completely naïve dialectics, the existence can be already equal to nothing compares with the essence, though it's not totally diminished yet (it does not matter whether it is diminished for real).

The structure of this research is revealed by Figure 1, which the graph of epistemology's mechanism: the external part represents the first person to the non-first person objects, and the internal part performs the relation between the cognized stuff with the first person- the operation of the epistemology's paradigm. In other words, the first person is a solid point because it is indeed the first person; the non-first person is an empty point because it is assumed as non-first person and got believed, rather than guaranteed.

3. The Metaphysical Deconstruction of Language

The purpose of deconstructing language is to correspond the linguistic vocabulary with the metaphysical research objects to reveal the principle of the language model usage's mechanism. In this method, the language here is only a type of behave, which is taken as the representation

of all kinds of understandable information.

3.1 Speaker and the First Person

Language is a representation of the first person in the attributed ontological pattern of "person" s will. The words from the first person never confront to the first person. Though it is the words that the first person behaves to himself, the listener of these words will be the self projection (reflection) of the first person which is coordinate to other objects; if the words were recorded as a note for the future self, the first person still plays the listener (or reader- the receiver of language in any forms) rather than the speaker (writer).

Speaker, which is based on the reflection (projection) from self cognition of the first person that accepts the property (nature) upon "person". To retrospect the action of speaker from his language can move the vision to an opposite position to the spoken first person and the speaker- listener, although "I" am still the first person.

The first person reflection and "my words" are marvelously different but also similar: to the reflection of first person, the first person can play both origin and receiver synchronously; nevertheless, the speaker can only play the starter or receiver presently. (This situation does get influenced by the time, but the result of the ontological research would finally blow off all the mist; since the current "person(s)" rely on the time, it does not need to be impatient on dissecting the time) Two different relations between the first person to its reflection and speaker (as the first person) to his words represent the area that the first person and "person" do not overlap. Within, the undecided ontological meaning of the first person and speaker uncovers the complex nature of the first person: the demarcation between essence and existence of epistemology and ontology is increasingly vapory – the first person reflection and speaker identity are both the first person's extension, and the word is a concrete manifestation of them, which is a kind of evidence of existence, however, the final target aimed by the evidence is still a mysterious secret. On account of unsubstituted ontological value of the first person compares with the reflection and speaker (as the context), the "evidence" at most can mark the reality of first person's existence on the united agreement of "un-nihilistic world (exist)". (when people discussion about exist, at least the world exists) But the blinds cannot draw the conclusion of the elephant by touching a part of it, and a footprint on the sand does not equal to that pair of feet.

Even if the separation of the first person, second person and third person are not clear, the first person notwithstanding not equal to the nothingness-
Ontological noumenon precedes its existence!

“I” am the evidence of it, especially when “I” am not a “person”.

The context is going to get similar to the naïve dialectics, existence and essence would be merged together- they will befall with the ontology and epistemology, looks like the nothingness.

3.2 Words and Listener

The listener can be the creator of the explanation, but there is a chasm between the listener and the original meaning of the first person (the speaker). The first person can play as the listener, but the listener cannot be retrospectively as the first person- listener will transfer back to the speaker by his linguistic feedback. When the listener leaves the attributed identity as person's first person, it can be apposed to the language itself, as the object for the listener (played by the first person). Withal, either the words and listener to the speaker (the first person), or the words and the speaker to the listener (the first person), the association between them are not as visible as the relation between the speaker with his own words, hence, the retrospection of them is far not organized like the last paragraph - the known stuffs (not the direct extension of the first person) like those are just the known stuffs, there are only connections between them, without a mutual root, before the gloomy ontological curtain of the first person drops.

As an object, the listener has the same relationship to the pattern of “person” with the speaker (as an object)- apposing to the attribution of the received words, and reverses to the direction of the extension towards the area of non- first person from the first person in the pattern of “person”- the first person's knowledge (things known by the first person, here it can be something received in language) will be attributed to the extension of “person”. When the process emerges inertia (which becomes as usual, like something transcendental) in the epistemology, the “person” becomes the speaker of the words that are heard (received) by the first person (played) listener, vice versa. (The listener to the first person speaker- would transform to the speaker to resume the original situation due to the same system's feedback(language))

To clarify irregularity between the linguistic concept and it represented philosophical concept, is the key to get rid of the maya(मया)- an ancient Hindoo philosophy concept, which means the illusion of the world.

4. The Introduction of the Linguistic Modeling

This methodology of linguistic model is based on the principal of the Section 3, which would be used to make a description of the internal parts of the epistemology: the

speaker will be used to represent the first person, and so words and sentences will play as the epistemological activity and objects of the first person. This inspection will uncover the paradigm of epistemology's operation and extension, which will be also taken as research material of the ontological speaker (the first person) to push the vision from the internal to external- peel subsidiary of the speaker on the first person to finish the introspection.

5. Epistemology

5.1 Precondition—the Conjecture of Uniqueness

So far, here is a magnificent point has been almost ignored by the history of philosophy and the context, which is the source of knowledge- “whether the epistemology people (philosophers) discuss is a same epistemology” (the unique epistemology in the epistemological philosophy discussion across the history). Although it might have already been an unnamed default knowledge, I am still addressing it as a conjecture- the obviousity of this knowledge is adequately not less than “The first person is ‘I’”. The clarification of this theory is the key to make the standpoint of researcher rigor and stable, also, distinguish from other potential situations:

- 1) The ontology(s) exist but it has no epistemology (or it does not show).
- 2) An ontology has multiple epistemologies- this research has been built on the association between “the first person- epistemology”, which is the epistemology in this conjecture. Nevertheless, the first person represents ontology rather than equals to it. Thus, whether this ontology potentially has multiple epistemologies, it should be uncovered until the retrospection finished. On the other hand, this situation on other ontologies would be focused by other research projects.
- 3) Different ontologies, the possible epistemologies are as mysterious as them- at least the precondition of different ontologies mean the epistemologies as their extension will be different, although they (epistemologies) might look similar.

Back to the conjecture of uniqueness, here are some basic supports about this conjecture: first and foremost, the concept of “person” (the default unit of self-conciseness) involves clarification, which plays the representation of a whole system of recognition (context world of person), also as the most usual pattern taken by the first person- though the names on the first person sometimes transfer to also concepts (like spirit, will...), all of these are included by the context of the “person” world, which implies the unity of the world's origin for the first person (person)- the one, same epistemology. If the patten of “person” is dis-

sected, the first person left would still open the new context by “I (me)”- hence the distance between “I (me)” (the first person’s direct representation) to “(me) this person” would be secret; but the as an extension of epistemology, language makes this distance contained into the “person” world (but the language only represents the epistemology instead of equaling it, so the conjecture can not be proved by this point), which recurs the identity of the mentioned epistemology in the history of philosophy (it might be not just unique in the discussion of philosophy, but also most of human knowledge).

Secondly, although many of philosophers in the history researched the epistemology, but they seldom point out the word “epistemology”, just like the epistemology is the whole thing about human understanding- similar to a bunch of miners who are working in a same mine, they do not need to mention “this mine or the mine”; even if the word epistemology is mentioned, there had never been number adjectives used on it, which can be understood as the word epistemology has an invisible one before it- one (an) epistemology can be written as “epistemology” – this unified clarity made the history of philosophy went smoothly. (Though there are some known exceptions that are not on this epistemology, like the naïve dialects; or the extension from the supreme ontological object like God that gets rid of this universal epistemology)

Finally, which is the similarity of the explanation on the paradigm of the epistemology, it implies the high possibility of the unified truth from the same epistemology. (Paradigm would be specifically focused on next part.)

5.2 Internal—the Epistemology’s Paradigm

About the epistemology’s paradigm, as 5.1p. said, the similar expressions were represented by different philosophers over the history, just like Locke and Satre. [2, 10] Except this, the set theory mentioned by Altshuler D and Gordon P’s semantic categories/features also works as a linguistic rule that expresses the analogous function [11-12]. However, any theories of epistemology’s paradigm upon are interfered with their ontological leitmotiv (all rooted in “person”, though with different attitudes). Thus, this paper bases on the relative ignorance of ontology to pursue the ontological origin from the epistemology, which would not give the epistemological result the ontological nature (the ontological concepts come from epistemology, like “person” “universe” ...). The fully trusted conjecture can be only understood as the reality’s conjecture rather than the reality itself- so do the epistemological results taken as ontological objects. (just like the listener known by the first person who plays the speaker) Nonetheless, the approximate progressive structure indeed exists in the paradigm. Here, this paper is going to bring three concepts out

to elucidate the universal epistemology (the epistemology philosophers talk about)’s paradigm and improve the work that makes philosophers sink into dilemma without clarified ontology.

Oriented concept (epistemological result)

Ordinary Unoriented concept (the elements constitute epistemological result (if the concept is only called as unoriented concept in this paper, it refers to ordinary unoriented concept))

Absolute Unoriented concept (the unoriented concept that cannot be used to constitute oriented concept, also, cannot be regarded as an oriented concept)

The paradigm:

When the epistemology launches, the oriented concepts (the epistemological results) made by unoriented concepts. The unoriented concept can be regarded as epistemological object (result), this moment it is the oriented concept; the known oriented concept can be the unoriented concept to make new oriented concept.

Here are some examples:

1. A tree (oriented concept)

One, plant, creature, green, rough, life... (unoriented concept)

2. Plant (oriented concept)

Multicellular, organism, organism, flower, food... (unoriented concept)

The demonstration of language is limited, just like an unoriented concept in example one- “one”, when it is an oriented concept, the linguistic representation of its unoriented concept will be narrow (some of them can be difficult to say by language). As a result, its unoriented concept always stay in the area of epistemological inertia (just like mathematical conclusion)- two divide two, two minus one (the oriented concept appears in its unoriented concept, which is the reason that makes the first person in the “person” pattern feel it totally understands this oriented concept by this kind of unoriented concept). Moreover, some simple oriented concepts are hard to be deconstructed by language into unoriented concepts either, which is because of the progressive nature (from simple to complicated) of language, hence, it can only behave the relation between oriented concepts and unoriented concepts on one direction (not bidirectional relation), for instance: white (this would be more clear in Chinese that the white here represents monotonous ‘white’ rather than ‘white color’- 白色): it’s a relatively original element in the linguistic performance (especially when the category of “color” is not clarified), which mostly be linguistically represent on connotation or new concept- for connotation, it can be

“purity”; or creates the new concept from “snow white” to “a snow white flower”. But this kind of direction also built on the ontological belief made illusion (this is obvious on Locke), so it is necessary to stress the difference with their theories when checking the epistemological paradigm- the oriented concepts and unoriented concepts are flowing, without fixed directions. Except the instant launch of epistemology that has the inverse direction with the internal direction in Figure 1, but same as the external direction, because the oriented concepts made by unoriented concepts are the symbol of non-first person objects for the first person. “White” can be the oriented concept, and the former oriented concepts made by the unoriented concept “white” now are the unoriented concepts to cognize the oriented concept “white”, which is the “white” more completed- this situation reveals another nature of this epistemology: the oriented concept would more completed when the amount of the unoriented concepts add for the same oriented concept (comparing with the same oriented concept before adding new unoriented concepts). This point can be represented geometrically: assuming unoriented concepts are the endpoints can automatically connect, the increasing of points can move up the number of dimensions (line-surface- ... if it keeps in the same dimension then the information will be enriched)- in order to make more completed oriented concept. (The geometric analogy is only to help understand this nature of epistemology)

In addition to it, there is another rule of the epistemology, which is an oriented concept’s unoriented concepts must be same or more than two (except for the extreme situation in the third part of chapter six). Also, the unoriented concept can be only added rather than decreasing for same oriented concept.

Here is a couple of examples one the same first person:

Examples:

1). (2011) (afternoon) (Nanjing) (Jiangdongmen elementary school) (class C) (grade three)’s (platform)’s (right side), (the fourth from left to right), (without producing area’s information), (upper red and yellow base), (with black marks), (smooth), (I guess it’s tasty)’s APPLE

2). ((my)Granma) (bought) APPLE

For the oriented concept under the same name, the Example 1 grasps better than the second example- even if the unoriented concepts can be deconstructed to uncountable unoriented concepts as oriented concepts, since the APPLE here is a same oriented concept for the same first person and the comparison of unoriented concepts is limited in APPLE’s unoriented concepts- APPLE’s unoriented concepts’ unoriented concepts when they are oriented concepts are not APPLE’s unoriented concepts. (this paper always uses the simple present tense due to the stress on the

version in the “changing” world, which is not the symbol of understanding towards the timeliness)

6. Ontological Origin (External)

6.1 Nature of Epistemology: Epistemological Results and Non-First Person

As mentioned in Section 2, the relationship between non-first person objects and epistemological results decides philosophers’ attitudes about this epistemology’s nature. Epistemological results, the oriented concept, is the feedback of the launch of epistemology from the first person to epistemologically point to the direction towards the non-first person. Different from the obvious reflection of the first person in rational thinking (the superficial difference between rational and intuitional thinking is the appearance of the first person’s reflection, which only works in rational thinking- in the range of this universal epistemology). Although both of them are foggy and unclarified, it has different association with the first person than the epistemological results, which is the different association with the research between the first person and non-first person: the connatural interaction between the first person and the ontological origin makes all the fog of ignorance not to block the understanding towards the reflection (though the first person can not completely coincide its ontology, it can locate the noumenon) The unclarified but not totally unknown distance from the first person to the first person’s reflection has the difference with the distance between the epistemological result to the non-first person object just like the epistemologically can not be crossed difference between speaker and listener (for the first person who plays one role)- “I am thinking”, “I think I am thinking” and “I am thinking about philosophy” can represent this difference: when it comes into words, all “I” in the sentence are played by the first person’s reflection that be born out of the first person to be written into this “person” world of the first person; even when the subject changes to others- “He is thinking about philosophy”, the reflection is just not appearing somehow- the panorama of this sentence is actually “(I) (think/ other verbs) he is thinking about philosophy”. Just like the intuitional thinking, the first person reflection does not appear in the language model. Because the first person who plays the speaker directly goes into the context world without using its reflection. (Withal, the reflection which can be used to substitute the first person reveals the apposed relation with the epistemological results)

In contrast, the epistemological results that are not regarded as the representation of the first person can be associated with the non-first person (in which the reflection can

be retrospected to the first person and the epistemological results are retrospected to the non-first person objects; but the clarity on the first person does not exist on the non-first person objects): epistemological result is the evidence and fruit of the launched epistemology from the first person to non-first person. But the property of the epistemological results can not be equal to the non-first person which contains ontological property. As Schopenhauer mentioned, the distance between non-first person objects and epistemological results forms a fort- even though it cannot be broken without being beyond the universal epistemology, but you can go around it and the soldiers in it are unable to come out and attack you. [13]

The epistemological results can be regarded as the non-first person objects' reality in the "person" context world, as a 99.999-% possible true conjecture. Also, since the first person can not coincide all ontological content, the actual ontological property of non-first person is not clear. Nonetheless, this situation can be defined as the launch of the universal epistemology to the non-first person objects rather than the cognition is succeeded. The representative of ontology- the first person has not veritably touched the non-first person objects. Whatever the non-first person matches the ontological noumenon or the first person (objects are called as non-first person because the starter of epistemology is the first person), they/it can still be attributed to the unknown category- though it is not totally agnostic.

The universal epistemology is a disabled epistemology, or it could be called as a fake epistemology. But there is no escaping the fact that it can always let a sort of existence being, compare with the nothingness. Although that kind of existence is only itself.

6.2 The First Person and the Pattern of "Person"

The epistemology research is originated by an illusion, which is the adjective that can be hidden but not dissected- "person('s)". In the linguistic expression, the epistemology research is also the "person" research- this is because language is an extension of epistemology, which grows in the "person" world. Oppositely, the reality is that the epistemology gives birth to "person", as a unit to locate the first person, "person" becomes a symbol of epistemology's retrospection- I (as a "person") discovers paradigm during the epistemology research made this illusion happen after "I" expressing it(so do this research). The boundary between name and being is always ignored in the metaphysical discussion, the retrospection of epistemology passively the dropping into the epistemological pattern and get expressed. (this kind of paradox-like phe-

nomenon would be explained in chapter seven)

The "person" pattern provides a role to the first person's reflection in the epistemology (the "I" in sentences has already haven the role of "person", which is a fundamental of self-consciousness). In the viewer (philosopher)'s sight, the name of "person" comes before first person's name though its being comes later, as an oriented concept with flexible unoriented concepts- a base for the epistemology to be launched in this unknown world. Undoubtedly, "person" is epistemologically inertial (as the unoriented concept of new oriented concept, this original oriented concept act regular, hence becomes the principle in the world of epistemological results- time, logic are relatively stable among them and the concept like morality is relatively unstable), but its special position in the context makes it more complex. Why does this epistemology give the first person a world like this "based on 'person'"? Is "person" world the only result of the world by epistemological results? They will be the further significant internal epistemology problem in the future. Also, all this kind of question has a lack of validity since the standpoint can not get rid of "person" or beyond this epistemology.

About the first person's reflection, "person" pattern takes the most important function of it in nowadays circumstance. The discussion about this reflection would be too abstract and hollow, though it still not escapes from the range of epistemological result. This "uncolored" reflection of the first person has an obvious meaning itself, which is the result of epistemology's launch that contains deeper fundamental meaning than "person".

6.3 The Limit of the Universal Epistemology-Obliteration of the First Person's Reflection (projection)

The nature of the universal epistemology is already clarified- a disabled and fragile possibly fake (if the epistemology can actually grasp objects is discovered) epistemology. It can still launch to the non-first person objects and produce epistemological results to represent the objects, the resource of it can be only attributed to the wide category of non-first person. The epistemological result can not substitute the non-first person objects due to its lack of the ontological property. (though they play as the ontological objects in the "person" world as believed conjecture) Nevertheless, this epistemology also has its limit- the action can utterly launch the epistemology.

As 5.2. mentioned, the number of unoriented concepts can not less than 2 to build an oriented concept, except for this situation- the epistemology is launching to the first person. Indeed, the cognition of the first person needs to pass the reflection of itself. This reflection exists, as an oriented

concept. Different from other situations' reflection (they involve the specific epistemological content to be made as a part of the "person" world), this reflection has no additional meaning/ function except the first person- "I".

One unoriented concept can create a stable structure to build a oriented concept like the organization of two or more unoriented concept. The structure of one unoriented concept would cause collapse. When this unstable situation happens, this oriented concept made by one unoriented concept just like a wormhole on the side of the total of epistemological results for the first person- everything in this epistemology falls into it, everything starts by the first person turns to be the content of this first person reflection, which makes the reflection almost obliterated (infinitely close to the first person itself). At this point, the first person itself fills the epistemology up- just like the history of philosophy did to the epistemology: the noun without a number adjective means the number of it is "one". (but if bringing the number concepts more one into this context, this ONE would be on another dimension compared to the one that comes from 2-1) This ONE takes all space of the epistemology without any gap. Because of it, the language can hardly behave it: "I am all my epistemological results/ I am everything (I know)"- if the "I" here is understood as the reflection as this paragraph mentioned, then it represents both oriented concept and unoriented concept; if it is understood as a normal reflection, then the sentence is meaning to point to the reflection of the epistemology's limit.

The oriented concept made by one unoriented concept is the first person, and this unoriented concept is the first person's reflection- the divide between them vanished. This reflection is the summation of the first person's epistemological results, which is the first person.

This is the only situation that the universal epistemology can touch the object, the epistemology is filled at this time, which makes it nearly invisible. Meanwhile, this supports the validity of the action that philosophers who start by the first person researching philosophy- standing on the first person avoids the circular proof as the second chapter discussed. On this perspective, all oriented/ un-oriented concepts contain ontological property- the first person ('s).

As Zhuangzi said: "the known does not say". [14] The "ONE/I" which is almost unspeakable is just the endpoint of this tragic epistemology.

6.4 Ontology, First Person and Epistemology

Why does the first person's ontology have an epistemology like this? This question can be hardly answered. Because the context starts by "person" is not enough to be

the background of this question. Even if it can be written, the standing point would not be kept. (the principle will be revealed in Section 7)

Nevertheless, there is another blank in this research, which the nature of the ontology involves the first person that extends this epistemology. Different from the non-first person which is attributed by the epistemology launch from the first person to locate the whole ontological objects as the epistemology's targets, the first person contains ontological property rather than equal to whole ontological content.

Here, it is meaningful to break an illusion, which is the framework of epistemological/ontological research: the ontology and epistemology mutually exist in the context of "person" world (as shown in Section 2). But this relation will be broken when we walk away from this context by realizing the complexity of ontology symbolized by the first person. (among the knowledge we already have) As the naïve dialectics uncovered, the noumenon represented by the epistemological results (language is epistemological) is nothingness-like, which must need the first person to be located, which is the reason why the first person is the ontological symbol).

Thus, what dimension does the first person work on to locate the noumenon? Existence. The first person is the existence of its noumenon, the epistemology of the first person is the proof of this existence- the being. The way this being birth must influence the reason of "person" pattern's appearance. Hence, an epistemology must have its ontology, but an ontology does not must involve an epistemology (if it does not exist, or as nothingness).

On the other hand, the noumenon does not have strong transcendental nature. The reason is same as the fort mentioned by Schopenhauer- the action goes around the fort does not beat the fort but achieved the target. [14] The conjecture made by epistemological results can work sometimes, it ascribes to the noumenon. For the linguistic expression, since the content about noumenon goes beyond the epistemology, the language would be discordant and strange (for example: "even if I do not exist, I exist." the first I is the first person and the second I is the noumenon). Regarding its expression, it will be more efficient to both use ideogram and phonogram: ideogram would be influenced by the given meaning of its invention, but it makes the interaction of oriented concepts and unoriented concepts concrete; though phonogram can not represent the paradigm as much as the ideogram, it can be easier transformed or offered new meaning, even using to describe the content beyond the universal epistemology. (Naïve dialectics is not an epistemology, but influenced by epistemology when it appears in the context of "person"

world)

7. The Explanation of the Situation Resembles Paradox in this Research

There are some paradox-like phenomena in this research, which are caused by the content beyond the universal epistemology but expressed by language (just like naïve dialectics and noumenon). Indeed, they are not originated from the universal epistemology, but they forcefully enter the epistemology and occupy oriented concepts and unoriented concepts and caused it. This disabled epistemology needs to be supported by the paradox in order to not collapse. Withal, the absolute unoriented concept mentioned in 5.2. is another situation, but it has already been expressed by oriented/ordinary unoriented concepts in language. This paradoxical invalidity makes the epistemology research gets rid of the epistemological results in the “person” world but a series of scientific theories. The reason is that these leaks are contained by the epistemology itself. Since these inexistences and invalidity are uncovered, the beings of them are also revealed (the epistemological results)- which is the (in)existence of their ontological fundamental (“person”). Besides, although philosophy is a science, the principle of philosophy research is not same as natural science. In philosophical research, the known fragment can be used to be the basis of the setting on unknown area to get scientific theories, especially the research beyond the universal epistemology.

8. The Outlook

The research about the epistemology’s nature and paradigm should have achieved a consent long time ago. And the further internal research is looking forward to developing and connecting with cognitive science. Moreover, the external research needs to have more inventory methods and improve the application of language. It will be extremely beneficial to get deeper understanding on ancient philosophy for the naïve dialectics or other external mechanisms influence the “person” context by interacting ontology with this universal epistemology; in addition to the mechanisms that have no obvious ontological influence on “person”, or not directly influence other epistemologies or ontologies without epistemologies. All these studies would be tough, but the exploration of naïve dialectics would definitely be helpful. Nevertheless, when the vision of philosophical research completely goes beyond the universal epistemology, the disappearance of the “person” would also cause the annihilation of philosophy.

9. Conclusion

To sum up, by applying the linguistic model, this research exhibits the oriented- unoriented concepts formed paradigm of epistemology and the deficient nature of this epistemology that this epistemology cannot touch the object except the first person itself when the epistemology and first person projection almost disappeared. Based on that, the ontological origin of this epistemology is retrospected, the first person is the existence of the noumenon, which is represented by the epistemology. This paper is going to bring focus of philosophical research out of the epistemology, though it accelerates the extinct of philosophy.

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